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Directed Deceased Organ Donation  
The Problem with Algorithmic Ethics 
 
Muireann Quigley 
 
Introduction 
 
The recent case of Rachel Leake, a mother who was denied a transplant using a 
kidney from her deceased daughter, has thrust both the Human Tissue Authority and 
the issue of directed organ donation back into the ethical spotlight. According to 
newspaper reports, Mrs. Leake has suffered from diabetes since she became pregnant 
with her daughter and, as a result, developed kidney failure seven years ago. She had 
a kidney transplant five years ago. However, the donated kidney failed last year and 
Mrs. Leake has been on dialysis since.1 
 
Mrs. Leake’s twenty-one year old daughter, Laura Ashworth, died in the intensive 
care unit (ICU) of the Bradford Royal Infirmary following a suspected asthma attack. 
Ms. Ashworth was on the Organ Donation Register and the transplant co-ordinator at 
the hospital became involved in her case. According to a report by BBC News, it was 
only after friends of Mrs. Leake’s daughter said that Laura would have wanted her 
kidney to be donated to her mother that she approached the transplant co-ordinator 
with this request.2 It was also reported that Laura had been willing to be a living 
donor but had not begun the formal process by which this could have taken place. UK 
Transplant (UKT), which has overall responsibility for co-ordination of transplant 
activities and the allocation of organs, appear to have referred the case to the Human 
Tissue Authority (HTA), which denied Mrs. Leake’s request.3 Subsequently, both 
kidneys and the liver of the deceased were donated to anonymous recipients. 
 
The decision was defended by the chief executive of the HTA, Adrian McNeil, who is 
reported in the press as having said that: 
 
The central principle of matching and allocating organs from the deceased 
is that they are allocated to the person on the UK Transplant waiting list 
who is most in need and who is the best match with the donor. In line with 
this central principle, a person cannot choose to whom their organ can be 
given when they die; nor can their family.4 
 
                                                 
1 For a selection of news reports which outline the story see 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/bradford/7344205.stm, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2008/apr/12/health.nhs, 
http://www.express.co.uk/posts/view/41126/Desperately-ill-mother-denied-daughter-s-kidney, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1584782/Mother-is-denied-her-daughter%27s-kidneys.html, 
and http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_style/health/article3732210.ece. Last accessed 07 May 
2008. 
2 This was reported by Mrs. Leake in an interview with BBC News. Available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/bradford/7344205.stm. Last accessed 07 May 2008. 
3 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1584782/Mother-is-denied-her-daughter%27s-kidneys.html 
and http://www.express.co.uk/posts/view/41126/Desperately-ill-mother-denied-daughter-s-kidney. Last 
accessed 07 May 2008. 
4 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/bradford/7344205.stm. Last accessed 07 May 2008. 
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This position was re-affirmed a couple of days later when the HTA released statement 
on the matter.5 
 
The decision by the HTA in this case does not seem defensible and raises a number of 
interesting ethical questions, both on the issue and nature of directed organ donation 
itself and on the manner in which ethical decisions are taken. First I look at the moral 
permissibility of directed donation. Then I turn briefly to one of the justice claims 
upon which the Authority made it decision in the Leake case. And finally I draw 
attention to the algorithmic manner in which the decision appears to have been taken 
and argue that inconsistent and unjustified policy ought not to be allowed to trump 
common sense thinking. 
 
 
 
Is Directed Donation Unethical? 
 
The assumption made by the HTA in the above case is that it is unethical for an 
individual (prior to death) or their families (after death) to direct to whom the organs 
of the deceased can be donated; or to attach conditions to the donation of those 
organs. However, the Authority did not make their decision in isolation, but were 
acting in accordance with established policy. The Department of Health, in their 
report An Investigation into Conditional Organ Donation, condemned such practices. 
The report concluded that: 
 
[T]o attach any condition to a donation is unacceptable, because it 
offends against the fundamental principle that organs are donated 
altruistically and should go to patients in the greatest need.6 
 
As such this has been the blanket policy on conditional donation since and the 
Authority could be seen as merely ensuring that it was followed. 
 
However, the report and the ensuing policy must be put into context. The report was 
published following an inquiry into a case in 1998 where the relatives of a deceased 
man agreed to donate the organs so long as they were transplanted into a white 
recipient. At the time this condition was accepted and both kidneys and the liver of 
the deceased were transplanted. Additionally the lung tissue and pancreas were 
donated for use in research. The public outcry that followed led to the investigation 
and report by the Department of Health. 
 
While we might find this particular case morally distasteful and be able to find 
reasons why this type of directed donation should not be allowed, the case of Rachel 
Leake gives us the opportunity to re-examine the concept and ask whether directed or 
conditional donation should always be considered to be morally impermissible.   
 
 
 
                                                 
5 HTA statement on directed donation of organs after death. 14 April 2008. Available at 
http://www.hta.gov.uk/newsroom/media_releases.cfm?cit_id=411&widCall1=customWidgets.content_
view_1&usecache=false Last accessed 07 May 2008. 
6 Department of Health, An Investigation into Conditional Organ Donation (DoH: London, 2000). 
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We Already Allow Directed Donations 
 
When considering the case of Rachel Leake the preliminary point that needs to be 
made is that we already allow directed donations. As Rachel Ankenny has 
highlighted: 
 
[W]hen we permit living donation, we are in fact indirectly endorsing a 
form of directed donation.7 
 
The majority of the living organ transplants that take place in this country are kidney 
donations from related donors. These are donations made by one individual for the 
benefit of another specified person. In fact when it comes to living donation it is those 
individuals who would wish to make a non-directed donation to an anonymous 
recipient that are subjected to a high level of scrutiny.8 It cannot be the case, therefore, 
that we in general and the HTA in particular, think that all cases of directed donations 
are in fact unethical. Why might this be? 
 
The connection between a related living donor and recipient is a morally significant 
relationship. It is not one based on prejudicial judgments towards another person or 
class of people. The decision, therefore, to donate an organ to a relative or friend is 
what Harris would call a ‘non-vicious’ choice.9 He argues that: 
 
[T]he disposition to love one’s family (and one’s friends) is a disposition 
that generally speaking makes life better all round, better for everyone.10 
 
While Kluge contends that: 
 
If one of the primary functions of gift-giving is to create and sustain 
intimate relationships, and if society recognises the … relationship as 
being of a uniquely intimate and exceptionally desirable sort, then the 
very act of so recognising it creates just the special kind of relationship 
that ethically allows for an exception to the rule of impartial allocation.11 
 
It is, however, far from clear that even in those cases where the conditions attached to 
donation may be ‘vicious’ whether or not we should completely prescribe against it. 
Nevertheless, a discussion of this point is outside the scope of this piece.12  
 
                                                 
7 Ankenny, R., ‘The Moral Status of Preferences for Directed Donation: Who Should Decide Who Gets 
Transplantable Organs?’ in Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics (2001) 10: 387-398, p.392. 
8 Interestingly prior to the Human Tissue Authority being set up there was a specific regulatory body to 
deal with unrelated transplants: the Unrelated Live Transplant Regulatory Authority (ULTRA). 
9 Harris, J., The Value of Life (New York: Routledge, 1985), pp.71-3. 
10 Ibid., pp.71-2. 
11 Kluge, E.W., ‘Designated Organ Donation: Private Choice in Social Context’ in The Hastings Center 
Report, 19(5) 1989: 10-16, p.13. 
12 For a wider discussion of conditional organ donation see Ankenny, R., ‘The Moral Status of 
Preferences for Directed Donation: Who Should Decide Who Gets Transplantable Organs?’ in 
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics (2001) 10: 387-398; Kluge, E.W., ‘Designated Organ 
Donation: Private Choice In Social Context’ in The Hastings Center Report, 19(5) 1989: 10-16; and 
Wilkinson T.M., ‘What’s Not Wrong with Conditional Organ Donation?’ in Journal of Medical Ethics 
29, 2003: 163-4. 
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The Greatest Need 
 
Perhaps then it was not a concern with the motives involved in the Mrs. Leake’s 
request that prompted the HTA to deny her the transplant, but one of justice. The 
report by the Department of Health in 2000, the statement by the Authority’s Chief 
Executive, the subsequent press release from the Authority all claim that deceased 
donor organs are allocated on the basis of ‘greatest need’. Again we find a dissonance 
with the permitted system of living donation. Here we do not champion those at the 
top of the UK Transplant waiting list or claim that they are the ones most in need of 
the transplant. I imagine it would be the cause of some outrage if the transplant co-
ordinator were to tell the living donor after the operation that his organ had not in fact 
been transplanted into his relative or friend but into another recipient as ‘their need 
was greater’. It is almost certain that the only reason most living donations take place 
is precisely because they are directed towards their relative that they care about and 
this is permitted regardless of the ‘greater need’ of others. As Kluge points out: 
 
Family ties, then, are uniquely privileging and identifying, and 
designated organ donation occurring within the immediate family 
context does not violate the equality-and-justice condition.13 
 
Algorithmic Ethics or Common Sense? 
 
One might point out that these criteria set out by the HTA are meant to apply to 
deceased and not living donations. Given that this is the case we must ask are there 
any morally relevant reasons that distinguish between deceased and living donations 
and that lend themselves to governing these donations by two different sets of moral 
principles: one system where the concepts of relatedness and family ties permit the 
donations to be directed and to trump the greatest need criterion, and the other where 
they do not. I, for one, cannot think of a reason that would support this dichotomy. 
 
It seems that for the sake of moral consistency that there are two options available. 
The first would be to decide that the principles of non-directed donation and greatest 
need really are the ones that should unfalteringly guide the United Kingdom’s system 
of organ donation. If this were to be the case then our scheme for living donations 
ought to be brought into line with that for deceased donations. Donations that are 
directed towards relatives and friends would no longer be permitted and those organs 
(mostly kidneys) that are procured would go to those at the top of the waiting list in 
the ‘greatest need’.14 Such a system, of course, would have an impact on the numbers 
of organs procured, with the most likely result being a significant decrease in organs 
for transplantation. It is unlikely that the HTA truly believes that non-directed 
donation and greatest need really are inflexible principles and this is shown by the fact 
that they are now considering whether the rules in this area should be changed.15 
 
                                                 
13 Kluge, op. cit., p.12. 
14 Of course the assumption that it is those at the top of the waiting list that are in fact in the greatest 
need is contestable, but that is a task for another paper. 
15 15 HTA statement on directed donation of organs after death. 14 April 2008. Available at 
http://www.hta.gov.uk/newsroom/media_releases.cfm?cit_id=411&widCall1=customWidgets.content_
view_1&usecache=false Last accessed 07 May 2008. 
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This leads us to the second option which is to recognise that not all forms of directed 
donation are morally reprehensible. The fact that we do not consider directed living 
donation to be unethical supports this. If the kinds of factors, such as relatedness and 
family ties, which would permit directed living donation also exist some exceptional 
cases involving deceased individuals, then those self same factors should also count 
for permitting directed donation in those cases. It is clear that the case of Rachel 
Leake is more analogous to the normal living donation scenario than it is to the usual 
deceased donation ones. Here we have a situation where Laura Ashworth had been 
willing to donate a kidney to her mother, but fate intervened before this could take 
place. Her support for organ donation in general was patent from the organ donor card 
that she carried. This in addition to her willingness prior to death to donate to her 
mother ought to have prompted the HTA to allow one of her kidneys to be used 
commensurate with her wishes.  
 
In this and similar cases it would have been legally permissible to allow the donation 
to be directed, it was simply a matter of policy that it was not.16 However, the quick 
application of a policy that was actually intended to stop racially motivated conditions 
being attached to the donation process led to the wrong decision being made in Mrs. 
Leake’s case. In order to be responsive rather than inflexible policy ought to guide not 
be absolutely binding. And when regulatory bodies make what are essentially moral 
decisions they should take care to ensure that common sense thinking triumphs over 
the algorithmic application of inadequately considered and unjustified policy that 
parades as ethical principles. 
 
 
                                                 
16 The Human Tissue Act 2004 which governs the area of donation and transplantation does not make 
directed illegal. 
